Origin of the distinction of tenses in Latin
prohibitions.
It will be remembered that Professor Elmer of Cornell University, in 1894 (American Journal of Philology) attacked the doctrine of Madvig that the perfect subjunctive in prohibitions was used where a definite individual was addressed, the present where the prohibition was general 1 ). Elmer advanced the theory that the perfect expressed a prohibition with greater energy, the present with less. The theory was reached, as it seemed to most critics, by the forcing of many examples, and the exclusion of others which should properly have been included. After a few advocates had come to its support, general opinion seemed to settle back again upon the older view. But a problem still remained unsolved; namely, How could such a distinction in the forces of the tenses have originated ?
Delbrück, V. S. 2, p. 380 seq. (1897), explained the meaning of the perfect in prohibitions as 'punktuell', that of the present being 'durativ' 2 ). The force thus attributed to the former tense he explained as belonging to it through descent from the old injunctive aorist. Brugmann Gr. Gramm, p. 501 (1900) gives the same explanation, referring to Delbrück.
The solution does not seem to me to promise to be final, for several reasons.
1. The aorist force in Greek prohibitions is simply the 1) References to most of the literature upon the subject are given by Lebreton Etudes sur la langue et la grammaire de Ciceron, 1901, pp. 293 seqq.
2) Grotefend's explanation Grammatik, 460, is similar. But he does not attempt to account for the origin of the supposed force of the perfect. force which this tense everywhere has in Greek. The Latin perfect subjunctive, on the other hand, is only in part of aorist origin, and is not, in fact, confined to aorist forces. Repeatedly, for example, it represents an 'exactum in futuro' in oratio obliqua.
2. The Latin present subjunctive is freely used where the idea is 'punktuell'. It would be hard if we where forced to explain such examples as ne attigas, Epid. 723, as expressing the 'durativ' idea.
3. The use of the perfect in prohibitions is only one of the uses of the perfect tense for which we have to seek a special explanation. The other uses are: the perfect subjunctive in commands and in wishes; the future perfect indicative, and even the perfect indicative, in place of the future indicative; and the perfect infinitive in place of the present infinitive. For these, the only possible explanation is that, out of the original force of completeness has arisen a secondary force of despatch, thoroughness, or finality, the total effect being one of energy or emphasis. Te interfectum esse convenit, 'you ought to be killed, and have done with it', Cie. Cat. 1, 3, 4.
To reject, for the perfect in prohibitions, an explanation which we should have to accept for these other uses of the 2) Gildersleeve had expressed substantially the same view of the power of the perfect, in saying, in a previous argument against my position, "exceptions (i. e. to the steady use of the present or the imperfect in clauses of purpose) occur under the influence of passion, perhaps under the influence of Greek, in which" etc idea, failed to convince me. It still seemed to me that the facts for the Ciceronian period, and for some time later, were as Madvig had thought.
I was therefore forced to the conviction that a change from the earlier differentiation had taken place, and that a new association for each tense had arisen. This could have come about only if the energetic feeling were more likely to occur in a prohibition addressed to an individual than in a general maxim. But precisely this seems altogether natural. In actual situations, our interlocutor's interests or our own interests may strongly demand that a certain thing should not be done, and this strength of the negative demand would be expressed by the perfect. Where no one in particular is thought of, intensity of feeling would be far less frequent. It seems to me probable that the frequent occurrence of the perfect in prohibitions addressed to individuals, and the infrequent occurrence of it in general prohibitions, led to the association of the former tense with the idea of individual prohibition, and of the latter with the idea of general prohibition. The process had been completed by Cicero's time.
Stranger associations of meanings have taken place. Thus the active and passive endings -e and -t of the Latin infinitive of course had nothing to do with tense when they were still respectively locative and dative noun-endings. We have no clue to the way in which, after they had ceased to be felt as case· endings, they came to serve as differentiations of voice. But the fact remains.
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